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THE MAJORIT ARIAN 
REHNQUIST COURT? 
NEAL DEVINS* 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
Recent (1995-2002) Rehnquist Court decisions striking down federal laws 
can be tied to "majoritarian" ·social and political forces.1 In explaining why I 
think this is so, I will not defend these decisions. It may be, for example, that 
these decisions were wrongly decided, or inconsistent with what the Justices 
have said in other decisions, or both. Moreover, these decisions may well re-
flect the personal preferences of the Justices voting to invalidate these laws. In-
stead, my point is that majoritarian forces help explain why the Rehnquist 
Court seemed so willing to strike down federal laws. 
Before turning to the Rehnquist Court and to the social and political forces 
that impact its decisionmaking, it is useful to provide some background to my 
project. Having spent much of the past sixteen years examining how constitu-
tional law is shaped by both judicial and nonjudicial actors, I am quite con-
vinced-as Robert Dahl put it in 1957-that the Court's constitutional decisions 
"are never for long out of line with the policy views dominant among the law-
making majorities of the United States."2 This does not mean that the Court 
never falls out of step with lawmakers or U.S. citizens. Court-curbing propos-
als, for example, are often a byproduct of shifting alignments within Congress-
Copyright © 2004 by Neal Devins 
This Article is also available at http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/lcp. 
* Goodrich Professor of Law and Professor of Government, College of William and Mary. 
A preliminary version of this essay was presented at a December 2002 conference at the Duke Law 
School, "The Constitution and Other Legal Systems: Are there Progressive and Conservative Ver-
sions?" From December 2002 to June 2004, Supreme Court decisionmaking has largely confirmed my 
December 2002 remarks. In this essay, I make brief mention of some of these decisions. The focus of 
this essay, however, is understanding why it is that Rehnquist Court decisions invalidating federal stat-
tutes from 1995-2002 could be labeled "majoritarian." 
Thanks to Erwin Chemerinsky, John McGinnis, Judith Resnik, Chris Schroeder, and Keith Whit-
tington for encouragement and criticisms. Thanks also to Dan Barnes for helpful research assistance. 
All errors are my own. 
1. Academic and newspaper commentary about Rehnquist Court "activism" has focused on these 
decisions, especially the Rehnquist Court's revival of federalism. Because much of this commentary 
has depicted the Court as arrogant by imposing its views on Congress and U.S. citizens, I thought it 
would be useful to focus my analysis on these decisions. At the same time, I think it would be wrong to 
infer from my analysis that Rehnquist Court decisions striking down state laws and/or overturning state 
court decisions are somehow "majoritarian." The dynamics of Congress-Court relations, as this article 
makes clear, are quite different from the dynamics of state-Court relations. 
2. Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National Policy-
Maker, 6 J. PuB. L. 279, 285 (1957). 
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so that a majority with constitutional views that differ from the Court's views 
replaces a majority that generally accepts the Court's decisionmaking.3 While 
these proposals are often prompted by Court rulings that strike down federal or 
state laws, it would nevertheless be wrong to measure whether the Court is 
countermajoritarian by looking at the frequency with which it strikes down leg-
islation.4 It may be, for example, that lawmakers delegate power to the courts 
either because the issue (abortion, slavery) threatens to disrupt existing political 
coalitions or because they want to cast a vote for something that is politically 
popular (flag burning, internet decency).5 Also, what if the laws the Court in-
validates are unpopular either with lawmakers or with the American people? If 
the law is truly outdated, its invalidation may well seem majoritarian.6 On the 
other hand, a law may be unpopular with the people but not with lawmakers. 
This was true with Lochner Court invalidations of first New Deal legislation. 7 
What then of the Rehnquist Court? By invalidating all or parts of thirty-one 
laws between 1995 and 2002,8 the Court has been characterized as "arrogant, 
self-aggrandizing, and unduly activist" by "giving insufficient deference-or 
even a modicum of respect-to Congress."9 Whatever one thinks of this charac-
terization, there is little reason to think that Congress and U.S. citizens will 
3. See generally Stuart S. Nagel, Court-Curbing Periods in American History, 18 V AND. L. REV. 
925 (1965) (discussing seven periods of intense Court-curbing and the factors that provoke conflict be-
tween the legislative and judicial branches). See also Richard Funston, The Supreme Court and Critical 
Elections, 69 AM. POLL Scr. REV. 795, 796 (1975) (noting that the Court performs a counter-
majoritarian role during "transitional periods, in which the Court is a holdover from the old coalition"). 
4. For similar reasons, it would be wrong to depict the Court as countermajoritarian or activist 
because it overturns precedent. It may be that that precedent cuts against the grain of prevailing social 
norms. This, of course, is what happened in the ten terms from 1937-46. During those years, the FDR 
Court validated the power of government to pursue social objectives through economic regulation and, 
in so doing, reversed thirty-two of its earlier decisions. WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, THE SUPREME 
COURT REBORN 233 (1995). 
5. See infra, Part III. See also Mark A. Graber, The Nonmajoritarian Difficulty: Legislative Defer-
ence to the Judiciary, 7 STUD. IN AMER. POL. DEV. at 35,37-38 (1993). 
6. Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part One: The Road to 1 u-
dicial Supremacy, 73 N.Y.U.L. REV. 333, 349-50 (1998). 
7. For a provocative argument, based on extensive surveying of public opinion polls, that the 
Lochner Court decisionmaking reflected public opinion, see Barry Cushman, Mr. Dooley and Ms. 
Gallup: Public Opinion and Constitutional Change in the 1930s, 50 BUFF. L. REV. 7 (2002). At the same 
time, by resisting reforms pushed by New Deal Democrats, these decisions placed the Court "squarely 
against the interests of the dominant political party of the period." Keith E. Whittington, Taking What 
They Give Us: Explaining the Court's Federalism Offensive, 51 DUKE L. J. 477,514 (2001). 
8. In its 2002-2003 term, the Court-for the first time since 1994-did not strike down any federal 
statutes. Instead, it limited its federalism revival by upholding Congress's power to limit states' rights 
on gender-related issues. See infra note 95. In its 2003-04 term, the Court also handed Congress impor-
tant victories. It upheld soft money limits in campaign finance reform legislation. See infra note 108. It 
also approved the Americans with Disabilities Act demand that state buildings be accessible to the 
handicapped. See infra note 95. The Court also turned down efforts to limit Congress's Spending 
Clause power. See infra note 112. 
9. This is how Suzanna Sherry depicts Rehnquist Court critics in Irresponsibility Breeds Contempt, 
6 GREEN BAG 2d 47,47 (2002) (explaining why the Court has reason to be contemptuous of irresponsi-
ble lawmaking by Congress). See also Barry Friedman, The Cycles of Constitutional Theory, LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 149, 162 (Summer 2004) (noting that "the talk among progressives is of complaints 
about judicial supremacy and the hegemony of the Supreme Court" and collecting quotes to prove his 
point). 
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soon countermand Rehnquist Court overreaching. Instead, the Rehnquist 
Court seems to be paying close attention to signals that Congress and U.S. citi-
zens have sent it. In this way, Rehnquist Court decisions striking down federal 
laws do not frustrate majoritarian preferences and, as such, follow the historical 
pattern.10 
In advancing this claim, I do not argue that the federal statutes invalidated 
by the Court were unpopular. Instead, I call attention to why neither lawmak-
ers nor the people cared passionately about the fate of these statutes. More-
over, I suggest that citizens and lawmakers look especially to the Court to check 
Congress. Because the people turn to the Court to check Congress, rather than 
trust Congress to responsibly utilize its enumerated powers, Court decisions 
striking down federal statutes look more like exercises of delegated authority 
than like countermajoritarian judicial review. What follows is a laundry list of 
factors supporting this conclusion. These factors are broken down into sections 
on public opinion, Congress, and the Rehnquist Court's sensitivity to signals 
sent by Congress and the American people. 
II 
THE AMERICAN PEOPLE SUPPORT BOTH THE COURT'S STRIKING 
DOWN FEDERAL LAWS AND ITS TURN TO FEDERALISM. 
Societal forces are inevitably part of the mix of constitutional law. So long 
as judges "are relatively normal human beings," observed Chief Justice William 
Rehnquist, they cannot "escape being influenced by public opinion ... .'m By 
reading the newspaper, talking with family members, and the like, Supreme 
Court Justices cannot escape "[t]he great tides and currents which engulf the 
rest of men.''12 The Rehnquist Court is no exception. Its anti-Congress deci-
sionmaking is in sync with public opinion. 
A. Public Distrust in the Federal Government 
Public opinion polls reveal that U.S. citizens today distrust "the government 
in Washington," especially compared to the mid-sixties when LBJ's Great Soci-
ety was in full bloom.13 In 1964, the American National Election Study asked 
"How much of the time do you think you can trust the government in Washing-
ton to do what is about right?" At that time, seventy-six percent of respondents 
answered "just about always" or "most of the time."14 By 1995, the percentage 
10. See sources and related text, supra notes 2-7. 
11. William H. Rehnquist, Constitutional Law and Public Opinion, 20 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 751, 
768 (1986). 
12. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 168 (1921). 
13. The polling data cited here (and much else in this point) is drawn from Chris Schroeder's excel-
lent article Causes of the Recent Turn in Constitutional Interpretation, 51 DUKE L.J. 307 (2001). 
14. /d. at 348. 
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dropped to twenty-three percent; in 2001 , it stood at twenty-seven percent,l5 
Correspondingly, people in the U.S. think that members of Congress care more 
about making themselves look better than making the country better (seventy-
four percent to seventeen percent).16 They also think that "those we elect to 
Congress in Washington lose touch with the people pretty quickly" (eighty-two 
percent to sixteen percent),17 and think that Congress is captured by "big com-
panies," "political parties," and the "news media" (ranging from seventy-nine 
percent to eighty-eight percent). 
B. Public Distrust in State and Local Government 
States and localities have not seen a sharp decline in trust during the same 
period. When asked how they would feel "[i]f the federal government trans-
ferred responsibility for more government programs to your state government," 
seventy seven percent of those polled in 1995 were "very" or "somewhat confi-
dent" that their state could do a better job managing those programs than the 
federal government.18 Likewise, when it comes to fighting crime, the public, by 
a 2 to 1 margin, has more trust and confidence in state and localities than in the 
federal government.19 In other words, "[d]isenchantment with the national gov-
ernment did not produce commensurate disenchantment at lower levels."20 
C. Lack of Public Support for Statutes Invalidated by the Rehnquist Court 
Even though some of the statutes the Court invalidated were politically 
popular, there is little reason to think there was significant public support for 
any of these measures. Consider, for example, the Communications Decency 
Act (CDA),21 the Line Item Veto Act,22 the Brady Bill,23 the Gun Free School 
Zone Act (GFSZA),24 and the Violence Against Women Act (VA WA).25 AI-
15. !d. When it comes to "foreign relations," especially after the September 11, 2001 terrorist at-
tack, U .S. citizens do trust the federal government. In a September 18, 2002 Gallup Poll, seventy-one 
percent of the respondents said they trusted the federal government's handling of international prob-
lems "a great deal" or "a fair amount. " Gallup Poll (question ID, USGALLUP.02Sept5 R37A), con-
ducted on Sept. 5, 2002, Gallup News Service, released on Sept. 18, 2003, available at http:// 
www.gallup.com. It is possible that this turn in public opinion has slowed the pace of the Court's feder-
alism revolution and, more generally, the Court's willingness to invalidate federal statutes. See supra 
note 8 (contrasting the 2002-03 and 2003-04 Supreme Court terms to the 1995-2002 period) . 
16. /d. at 336. 
17. !d. at 337. 
18. Gallup Poll (question ID, USHART.95CEG R21), conducted on Mar. 16, 1995, Gallup News 
Service, released on Mar. 30, 2003, available at www.gallup.com. 
19. Pew Research Center Poll of January 9, 1997, Roper Center, available at http://www.lexis-
nexis.com; see also NPR Poll of June 25, 2000, Roper Center at University of Connecticut (showing 
continuing public confidence in states and localities). 
20. Schroeder, supra note 13, at 350. 
21. 47 u.s. c. § 223 (2000) . 
22. 2 u.s.c. § 922 (2000). 
23. 18 u.s. c. § 922 (2000). 
24. 18 u.s. c. § 921 (2000). 
25 . The Violence Against Women Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, 114 Stat. 1491 (codified as en-
acted, amended and repealed sections of 8, 18, 20, 28, 42 U.S.C.) (106 H.R. 1248). 
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though polls measuring public support were taken of only two of the five stat-
utes-the background check provision of the Brady Bill and the Line Item Veto 
Act-polling data suggest that each of these statutes matched public opinion on 
the issue. Also, polling data show that several of the statutes addressed a prob-
lem that the public deemed important (school violence, domestic violence, pork 
barrel spending, handgun violence). At the same time, Court decisions invali-
dating all or parts of these statutes hardly registered with the public. Opinion 
polls were not taken about any of these rulings and there is no evidence sug-
gesting meaningful interest group or other pressure on Congress to counter-
mand these Court rulings.26 
In understanding why this is so,· it is useful to consider both the conse-
quences of these decisions and shifting attitudes about government. To start, 
populist distrust of Congress is linked to the changing balance of power be-
tween the federal and state governments. Unlike the New Deal and Great So-
ciety, in which support for centralized planning and the national administrative 
state were essential, the 1980s and 1990s saw the emergence of the devolution 
movement. For example, 
[t]hroughout the 1990s, the call for devolving more authority from the 
federal government to the states had enormous political appeal. . . . In 
almost all policy areas, states are portrayed as venues for creative and 
innovative solutions, and the federal government is the home of "one-
size-fits-all" solutions that are inflexible and inappropriate by com-
parison.27 
Correspondingly, with voters expecting less of the national government, law-
makers turn more and more to so-called "position taking" legislation. "The 
electoral requirement [of such measures] is not that [a lawmaker] make pleasing 
things happen but that he make pleasing judgmental statements."28 More to the 
point, judicial invalidation of such statutes is unlikely to prompt a populist back-
lash because those statutes are about delivering a symbol, not a good. 
The CDA and Line Item Veto Act are classic "position taking" measures. 
Lawmakers, for example, had little interest in allowing the President to punish 
their favored constituents by item-vetoing "pork barrel" appropriations.29 
Likewise, the legislative history of the CDA speaks to lawmakers' desire to take 
26. Congress did modify some of these statutes in response to the Court's rulings. But, as ex-
plained in Part II, there is no reason to think that Congress was especially disappointed by any of these 
rulings. See infra , Part III. 
27. Schroeder, supra note 13, at 325-26. 
28. DAVID R. MAYHEW, CONGRESS: THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION 62 (Yale University Press 
1974). For additional discussion in the context of Rehnquist Court federalism decisions, see Whitting-
ton, supra note 7, at 512-14. 
29. See Lisa Hoffman Scripps, Clinton Wields Line-Item Veto Lightly: Congress Piles Up 750 Pet 
Projects on Military Spending Bill; President Kills Just 13 of Them, ROCKY MTN. NEWS, Oct. 15, 1997, 
at 32A. Before the Court invalidated the Line Item Veto Act, some lawmakers who supported the 
statute were angered by President Clinton's (quite modest) use of his line item veto authority. /d. 
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a stand against smut, not to enact legislative restrictions that would withstand a 
constitutional challenge.30 An argument can also be made that the VA W A, 
GFSZA, and the Brady Bill are also "position taking" measures.31 Regardless 
of whether that argument is true, there are other reasons to think that these 
statutes were little noticed by, and of little interest to, most people in the U.S. 
The apparent uninterest (or at least the uninterest of pollsters to find out 
what the public thought) of the VAWA and GFSZA may be tied to the fact 
that most states criminalized domestic violence and gun possession in school 
zones. Indeed, since opinion polls on violence against women and school vio-
lence made no mention of VA W A and GFSZA, the public may have seen these 
issues as principally issues of state criminal law. In contrast, the Brady Bill was 
seen as necessary federal legislation because of the failure of some states to po-
lice gun ownership and the need to establish a national data bank. The Court's 
decision, however, did not have a substantial effect on government policy. Be-
ginning on November 30, 1998, roughly one year after the decision, gun dealers 
were required to check the names of prospective buyers against a computerized 
list of offenders prepared by the FBI. Consequently, with most U.S. citizens 
having little investment in these federal statutes, the immediate losers in these 
cases were politically isolated.32 
D. The Public Pays Little Attention to Rehnquist Era Federalism Decisions. 
Opinion polls and other data suggest that the public is either unaware of or 
does not care about Rehnquist era federalism decisions. In general, the public 
pays little attention to the Supreme Court.33 When people in the U.S. do pay at-
tention to the Court, they pay attention to decisions implicating civil and indi-
vidual rights. Over the past six years, for example, opinion polls were taken of 
Supreme Court decisions on affirmative action, school prayer, late-term abor-
tions, physician assisted suicide, and gays in the Boy Scouts. No polls were 
taken of any of the Court's federalism-related decisions. Considering that these 
decisions have limited the political victories of women's interests, the disabled, 
senior citizens, and religious minorities, the pollsters' disinterest in these cases 
seems surprising. Perhaps it is because the public, for reasons just detailed, had 
little invested in these federal statutes. Moreover, as Part IV details, none of 
the Court's federalism rulings foreclosed democracy. State and federal officials 
could respond to the Court through normal legislation, not Court-curbing 
30. Indeed, as I will explain in Part III, lawmakers signalled the Court that they thought the CDA 
and Item Veto Act were vulnerable to constitutional attack. See infra, Part III. 
31. See Whittington, supra note 7, at 513. 
32. Whittington, supra note 7, at 515. 
33. See David Adamany & Joel B. Grossman, Support for the Supreme Court as National Policy-
maker, 5 LAW & POLICY Q. 405, 407 (1983) (detailing opinion poll data). Correspondingly, it may be 
that media outlets, although reporting the Court's decisions, do not see the Court as an agenda setter; 
that is, coverage of an issue (school desegregation, for example) is not tied to landmark Supreme Court 
decisions. See GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE 111-16 (1991). For these and other rea-
sons, judicial appointments is a low salience issue for most voters. See Jeffrey Toobin, Advice and Dis-
sent: The Fight Over the President's Judicial Nominations, THE NEW YORKER, May 26,2003, at 48. 
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measures.34 Whatever the explanation, interest groups and lawmakers have not 
raised a stir about these decisions, thereby insulating the Court from populist 
attack.35 
It is also noteworthy that, as Barry Friedman put it, "public support for judi-
cial independence has repeatedly derailed attempts to interfere with that inde-
pendence. "36 In other words, it may be that judicial review is, in some measure, 
"majoritarian."37 And while I do not mean to suggest that the Court cannot 
help but be "majoritarian," I do think that a Court that focuses its energies on 
federalism, separation of powers, and symbolic legislation is operating within 
boundaries that most U.S. citizens find acceptable. 
III 
CONGRESS HAS SIGNALED TO THE COURT THAT THE COURT'S 
STRIKING DOWN OF FEDERAL LAWS AND, MORE GENERALLY, 
ITS TURN TO FEDERALISM ARE POLITICALLY ACCEPTABLE. 
Congress, too, seems accepting of Rehnquist Court decisions limiting its 
powers. Like the general population, lawmakers increasingly speak of the need 
to devolve power away from the federal government and otherwise limit Con-
gress. Congress also seems accepting of activist judicial review of its handiwork. 
A. Members of Congress Support Independent, Scrutinizing Judicial Review 
of Federal Statutes. 
Today, as revealed by a recent opinion poll of members of the 106th Con-
gress (1999-2001), lawmakers adhere to a "joint constitutionalist" perspective 
whereby "courts should give only 'limited' weight to prior congressional as-
sessments of constitutional issues, or 'no weight at all' to congressional interpre-
tation."38 In contrast, a substantial number of lawmakers in the 86th Congress 
(1959-61) expressed their disapproval of Warren Court decisions on race and 
communism by embracing an "independent constitutionalist" perspective. 
These members "emphasized the distinctive constitutional responsibilities of 
34. See infra, Part IV (D). 
35. When it comes to the confirmation of George W. Bush's judicial appointees, however, lawmak-
ers and interest groups sometimes refer to the Rehnquist Court's "activism." For reasons I have de-
tailed elsewhere (and will summarize in Part III), I think these charges of "activism" have relatively lit-
tle to do with individual Rehnquist Court decisions. For a more detailed treatment of this question, see 
Neal Devins, The Federalism-Rights Nexus: Explaining Why Senate Democrats Can Tolerate Rehnquist 
Court Decisionmaking But Not the Rehnquist Court, 73 U. COLO. L. REV. 1307 (2002). 
36. Friedman, supra note 6, at note 15. 
37. I develop this claim in both Part IV and the concluding paragraphs of this essay. See infra, 
Parts IV, V. 
38. See Bruce G. Peabody, Congressional Attitudes Toward Constitutional Interpretation (unpub-
lished manuscript, on file with author) (Peabody's data is suggestive, not conclusive, since less than 
twenty percent of lawmakers completed his surveys). 
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the legislature and pointed to drawbacks associated with leaving interpretation 
strictly to judges."39 
More striking, today's Congress sometimes treats the Constitution as the ex-
clusive province of the Supreme Court. One manifestation of this phenomenon 
is the growing use of "expedited Supreme Court review" provisions in cases for 
which Congress finds its handiwork constitutionally suspect.40 Specifically, 
rather than sort out the constitutionality of the legislation it is considering, 
Congress sometimes enacts a fast-track provision enabling litigants both to by-
pass the federal courts of appeal and to secure automatic Supreme Court re-
view. Over the past several years, Congress has included expedited review pro-
visions on several high-profile enactments, including the Communications 
Decency Act,41 the Line Item Veto Act,42 census reform legislation,43 McCain-
Feingold campaign finance legislation,44 and indecency restrictions on libraries 
and cable operators.45 
Congress signals the Court that constitutional questions are the Court's do-
main in other ways, as well. Today's Congress, for example, rarely casts doubt 
on either the correctness of the Court's ruling or, more fundamentally, the 
Court's power to authoritatively interpret the Constitution. Consider, for ex-
ample, Congress's nonresponse to Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 46 a 1995 
Supreme Court decision declaring that federal affirmative action programs must 
satisfy strict scrutiny review. In the immediate wake of the decision, Senator 
Phil Gramm proposed eliminating set-asides as the best way to "[conform] with 
Adarand. "47 Senator Patty Murray countered by proposing that federal funds 
can openly be used for programs "completely consistent with" Adarand.48 What 
is striking here is that neither Murray nor Gramm said a word about the right-
ness or wrongness of Adarand. Instead, their debate was premised on the belief 
that Adarand was the law of the land. Moreover, by overwhelmingly approving 
the open-ended Murray amendment (84-13), the Senate signalled that litigants 
seeking a definitive answer of what Adarand means should go to a higher au-
thority than Congress, namely, the federal courts. Congress's handling of Ada-
rand is hardly aberrational; as detailed below, much the same can be said of 
Congress's response to recent Court rulings that strike down federal statuteS.49 
39. !d. at 8; see generally DONALD G. MORGAN, CONGRESS AND THE CONSTITUTION: A STUDY 
OF RESPONSIBILITY (1966). 
40. This paragraph and the next are drawn from Neal Devins, Congress as Culprit: How Lawmak-
ers Spurred on the Court's Anti-Congress Crusade, 51 DUKE L.J. 435,442-43 (2001). 
41. 47 u.s.c. § 223 (2000). 
42. 2 u.s.c. § 922 (2000). 
43. Help America Vote Act, 2 U.S.C. § 438 (2000). 
44. 18 u.s.c. § 607 (2000). 
45. Child Online Protection Act, 15 U.S.C.§ 6501 (2000). 
46. 515 u.s. 200 (1995). 
47. 141 CONG. REC. 19,670 (1995). 
48. Id. at 19,667. 
49. Devins, supra note 40, at 445-6. 
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B. Today's Congress is Accepting of States' Rights and Other Limits on Fed-
eral Power. 
71 
Throughout the 1990s, Congress approved various initiatives shifting power 
away from Washington and to the states. Examples include the Unfunded 
Mandates Act of 1995, 1996 welfare reform legislation, and a 1998 appropria-
tions bill prohibiting the Clinton administration from limiting states rights' pro-
tections in an existing Executive Order.50 This trend reflects the growing recog-
nition that, "[i]n contrast to the major social issues of thirty years ago, today's 
important issues do not so obviously demand a federal solution."51 Perhaps for 
this reason, presidential and congressional elections are filled with anti-big gov-
ernment rhetoric.52 
Most notably, when Republicans took over both houses of Congress in 1994 
(the very time when the Rehnquist Court began its federalism revival), House 
Republicans ran on the so-called "Contract with America." Seeking to capital-
ize on widespread dissatisfaction with Washington, the Contract pledged a 
smaller federal government and a larger role for the states. Among other re-
forms, the Contract promised line item veto legislation (because Congress could 
not be trusted to enact responsible spending bills), unfunded mandates reform 
(because Congress could not be trusted to respect state prerogatives), and a 
vote on a constitutional amendment to establish term limits (because members 
of Congress lose touch with their constituents). Furthermore, while most voters 
did not know about the "Contract," voter disenchantment with Congress helped 
propel the 1994 Republican takeover.53 
Today's Congress therefore is apt to be somewhat sympathetic to Court ef-
forts to protect state prerogatives. Unlike Court-curbing periods, in which the 
Court frustrated lawmaker desires to pursue critical legislative initiatives, Con-
gress does not see judicial invalidations of federal statutes as inconsistent with 
Congress's broader legislative agenda. For this very reason, after observing that 
lawmakers seemed "detached from the actual work of the federal judiciary, par-
ticularly as it relates to the exercise of congressional power," Representative 
Lee Hamilton speculated that Congress "has become more conservative, and 
many members are comfortable with most of the Court's rulings."54 Moreover, 
50. LOUIS FISHER & NEAL DEVINS, POLITICAL DYNAMICS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 92 (3d ed. 
2001). For additional discussion, see Schroeder, supra note 13, at 325-26. 
51. Schroeder, supra note 13, at 344. There are exceptions, the most notable being the War on 
Terror. 
52. This is not just about Republicans. Bill Clinton and other "New Democrats" have echoed this 
theme. See, e.g., Kevin Merida, Last Rights for Liberalism? Democrats' Legacy Now Symbolizes Their 
Woes?, WASH. POST, Dec. 28, 1994, at Al. 
53. Ronald G. Shafer, Democrats Fight a Problem: Voters Prefer GOP Views on Many Issues, 
WALL ST. J., Oct. 21, 1994, at Al. 
54. 144 CONG. REC. E48 (daily ed. Jan. 28, 1998) (statement of Rep. Hamilton (D-In.)); See also 
Barry Friedman & Anna Harvey, Electing the Supreme Court, 78 IND. L.J. 123, 125 (2003) (noting that 
"a Supreme Court that faces an ideologically congenial Congress has more freedom to strike statutes 
enacted by past Congresses."). 
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up until now, Court decisions have not prevented Congress from responding to 
constituent demands.55 
C. Rehnquist Court decisions striking down federal statutes have not been of 
particular concern to Congress. 
Congress has largely ignored Rehnquist Court invalidations of federal laws. 
For example, the Congressional Record contains virtually no commentary about 
the Court's action in these cases. With three notable exceptions, U.S. v. Morri-
son56 (invalidating VA W A), City of Boerne v. Flore~7 (invalidating the Religious 
Freedom Restoration Ad8 (RFRA)), and Clinton v. City of New Yor/C9 (invali-
dating the Line Item Veto Act), few comments exist about the wisdom of any of 
the Court's decisions.60 Likewise, a search of the Congressional Record suggests 
that Congress is not concerned about the precedential value of these decisions. 
Lawmakers have mentioned the precedential impact of Boerne,61 which invali-
dated the RFRA, on only ten occasions62-a startling fact when one considers 
that Boerne embraced a standard of review that significantly curtailed Con-
gress's Section Five enforcement powers under the Fourteenth Amendment. 
United States v. Lopez,63 which invalidated the Gun-Free School Zones Act, also 
has received limited attention in congressional debates. Notwithstanding that 
Lopez was the first case in more than sixty years to declare a federal statute 
outside Congress's Commerce Clause power (and that it has since proven an in-
strumental precedent in invalidating the VA W A), lawmakers have seldom 
mentioned Lopez's precedential impact.64 Finally, the Court's anti-
commandeering cases, Printz v. United States65 and New York v. United States,66 
have not figured into congressional deliberations. 
55. See infra Part III. 
56. 529 u.s. 598 (2000). 
57. 521 u.s. 507 (1997). 
58. 14 u.s.c. § 2000 (2000). 
59. 524 u.s. 417 (1998). 
60. With the exception of Boerne, Clinton, and Morrison, a LEXIS database search of Congres-
sional Record, All Congress Combined, for "Court" and either the name of the case or relevant law for 
the period of one month following the date of the decision returned no more than four results. 
61. 521 u.s. 507 (1997). 
62. ALEXIS database search of the Congressional Record, All Congress Combined, from June 25, 
1997 (the date of the Boerne decision) to June 24, 2002 returned only ten results. On nine other occa-
sions, Boerne was mentioned-principally in connection with efforts to revamp the RFRA. 
63. 514 u.s. 549 (1995). 
64. A LEXIS database search of the Congressional Record, All Congress Combined, from April 
26, 1995 (the date of the Lopez decision) to June 24, 2002 returned only sixteen results. 
65. 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (invalidating background check provision of the Brady Bill). ALEXIS da-
tabase search of the Congressional Record, All Congress Combined, from June 19, 1992 (the date of 
the New York decision) until June 24, 2002 returned only six results. 
66. 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (invalidating legislation requiring states to either find a way to dispose of 
low-level radioactive waste or to "take title" to the waste). A LEXIS database search, Congressional 
Record, All Congress Combined, from June 27, 1997 (the date of the Printz decision) to June 24, 2002 
returned only two results. On several other occasions, members of Congress have introduced letters, 
memoranda, and resolutions that mention these cases-thirteen times for New York and three times for 
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Correspondingly, when Congress does respond to the Court, it has been 
compliant. It has treated Court rulings as final and authoritative-a precedent 
to deal with, not to overrule.67 Consider, for example, lawmaker efforts to re-
spond to Court decisions invalidating the CDA, the GFSZA, and the VA WA-
three of the four statutes that Congress revised in response to Rehnquist Court 
decisionmaking. The legislative histories of all three statutes emphasize the 
need to conform with Supreme Court standards.68 The Children's Online Pro-
tection Act,69 which replaced the CDA, "address[ed] the specific concerns raised 
by the Supreme Court,"70 including the lack of legislative hearings, the failure to 
consider less restrictive alternatives, and the overbroad definition of what con-
stitutes indecency.71 Likewise, when a bipartisan coalition of senators intro-
duced the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 2002 (replacing 
the GFSZA),72 their agenda was simple: "to heed the Supreme Court's decision 
regarding Federal power and yet to continue to fight against school violence."73 
Finally, when responding to the decision overturning VA WA, a bipartisan coa-
lition of lawmakers (including John Ashcroft (R-MO), Paul Wellstone (D-MN), 
Orrin Hatch (R-UT), and Joseph Biden (D-DE)) made no effort to revive the 
right to sue provision struck down by the Supreme Court.74 Instead, lawmakers 
focused their energy on federal funding directed at the prevention of domestic 
violence.75 
This degree of lawmaker acquiescence is striking, especially since most of 
these measures were overwhelmingly supported by both Democrats and Re-
publicans.76 One explanation-alluded to above-is that most statutes struck 
down were "position taking" measures. Specifically, when casting a vote for a 
Printz. Matthew D. Adler & Seth F. Kreimer, The New Etiquette of Federalism: New York, Printz, and 
Yeskey, 1998 SUP. Cr. REV. 71, 138. 
67. I do not mean to suggest that everyone in Congress bows before the Court. On occasion, 
members of Congress have criticized Rehnquist Court decisionmaking. In one instance-Congress's 
post-Boerne efforts to revamp the RFRA-lawmakers considered enacting legislation casting doubt on 
the Court's ruling. See infra. But these are exceptions to an overwhelming pattern of lawmaker disin-
terest or acquiescence. 
68. Congress also responded to the Court's decision invalidating the RFRA. In so doing, Congress 
did not seek to override the Court. Instead, as Orrin Hatch put it, Congress sought to "do what it can 
to protect religious freedom in cooperation with the Supreme Court" The Religious Liberty Protection 
Act of 1998: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 1 (1998). 
69. 15 u.s. c. § 6501 (2000). 
70. H.R. REP. No. 105-775, at 12 (1998), reprinted in 1998 U.S.C.C.A.N. (112 Stat. 2681) 736. 
71. !d. 
72. 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(2)(a) (2000). When the Act was introduced, it was called the Gun Free 
School Zone Act of 1995. 141 CONG. REC. S7919 (daily ed. June 7, 1995). 
73. !d. at S7920 (statement of Sen. Kohl); see also Guns in Schools: A Federal Role?: Hearing be-
fore the Subcomm. on Youth Violence of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 9 (1995) 
(statement of Walter Dellinger, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, explaining how 
the statute conforms to Lopez). 
74. On the House side, however, some lawmakers unsuccessfully sought to include a civil legal 
remedy in the statute. H.R. REP. No. 106-891, at note 30. 
75. The Violence Against Women Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, 114 Stat. 1491 (codified as en-
acted, amended, and repealed sections of 8, 18, 20, 28,42 U.S.C.). 
76. See Devins, supra note 35, at 1309-10; see also infra Part IV (C). 
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politically popular measure, legislators may not care whether the Court ap-
proves the statute. Their concern, more than likely, is the price they will pay if 
they oppose such a measure.77 Along the same lines, the Court's invalidation of 
the statute provides lawmakers with an opportunity to revisit the issue and to 
gain political mileage by enacting a "Son of" statute designed to fix the problem 
identified by the Court. 
D. Democratic Attacks on the Rehnquist Court are Motivated by Judicial 
Confirmation Politics. 
The fact that Senate Democrats and some interest groups attack the 
Rehnquist Court for engaging in "conservative judicial activism" does not 
mean that Senate Democrats find the individual decisions of the Rehnquist 
Court especially troubling. These attacks, instead, may be motivated by a de-
sire to limit Bush White House control over judicial appointments. Judicial 
confirmation politics operate around a different set of incentives than lawmak-
ing, including legislation enacted in response to Court decisions overruling fed-
eral statutes.78 In particular, Democrats will always have an incentive to attack 
the judicial appointees of a Republican president and Republicans will always 
have incentive to attack Democratic appointees. Specifically, the forward-
looking nature of the confirmation process exacerbates increasing polarization 
within Congress, including each party's desire to send a distinctive message and 
to pay back the other party for its partisan decisionmaking. Moreover, because 
Court decisionmaking is consequential, lawmakers often see the confirmation 
process as a politically salient way to advance their ideological preferences. 
Against this backdrop, it is surprising that Rehnquist Court decisions strik-
ing down federal laws received little to no mention in contentious battles over 
Bush judicial appointees.79 Abortion and civil rights were the rallying calls in the 
fights over John Pickering, Priscilla Owen, Michael McConnell, and, to a lesser 
extent, Jeffrey Sutton and Miguel Estrada. Indeed, Senate Democrats filibus-
tered the Pickering and Owens appointments because of civil rights and abor-
77. William P. Marshall, American Political Culture and the Failures of Process Federalism, 22 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 139, 145 (1998) (noting that a "lawmaker who voted against the national 
Megan's Law or the national car-jacking law, for example, would almost certainly be characterized as 
being soft on crime in her opponent's next thirty-second sound bite"); Sherry, supra note 9, at 49, 54 
(discussing GFSZA, VA W A, and age discrimination legislation as examples of Congress pursuing that 
which is politically popular); see Whittington, supra note 7, at 513. 
78. For an elaboration of this claim and substantiation of the points made in this paragraph, see 
Devins, supra note 35. 
79. It is also noteworthy that judicial enforcement of federalism was not mentioned in either the 
2000 Democratic or Republican Party Platforms. The Democratic Platform emphasized the needs for 
"women and minorities" to fill judicial vacancies as well as the need for courts to protect "individual 
rights . . .including the right to privacy." Prosperity, Progress, and Peace 26, available at 
http://www.democrats.org/about/platform.html. The Republican Platform spoke of "judicial suprem-
acy" and "[a]varice among ... plaintiffs ' lawyers." Government for the People 4, available at 
http://www.rnc.org/GOPinfo/Platform/2000platform7.htm. 
HeinOnline -- 67 Law & Contemp. Probs. 75 2004
Summer 2004] THE MAJORITARIAN REHNQUIST COURT? 75 
tion.80 Roe v. Wade81 also played a prominent, if not defining, role in the 
McConnell confirmation.82 Over time, Senate Democrats may seek to limit the 
Bush White House by turning their attention to the Rehnquist Court's federal-
ism revival. For example, although civil rights dominated the Sutton confirma-
tion, Senate Democrats did question Sutton's role in making states' rights ar-
guments before the Rehnquist Court.83 
IV 
THE REHNQUIST COURT APPEARS SENSITIVE TO THE SIGNALS 
SENT IT FROM THE CONGRESS AND THE AMERICAN PEOPLE. 
The Rehnquist Court, like other Courts, has a strong incentive to take social 
and political forces into account. Lacking the power to appropriate funds or 
command the military, the Court understands that it must act in a way that gar-
ners public acceptance.84 This, of course, explains why the Court's decisionmak-
ing traditionally conforms to social norms. It also explains the methodology 
employed in this article. Specifically, it is necessary to examine the social and 
political forces surrounding Rehnquist Court invalidations of federal statutes 
before reaching any conclusions about whether the Court is countermajori-
tarian, activist, and out of touch with Congress and the general population. 
A. The Rehnquist Court is Both Aware of and Emboldened by Public Opinion 
Polls. 
In particular, Court decisionmaking striking down federal laws may well be 
tied to public support for the Court and public antipathy toward Congress. 
Opinion polls show that U.S. citizens' distrust of Congress does not extend to 
80. Likewise, before the Republicans 2002 takeover of the Senate, the then Democrat-controlled 
Senate Judiciary Committee refused to allow a vote on Pickering and Owens. 
81. 410 u.s. 113 (1973). 
82. Insisting that he would not be an "activist judge," McConnell said repeatedly that the abortion 
issue is "settled" and that "[i)t has been considered. It has been reconsidered, reconfirmed .... Today, 
it's much more reflective of the consensus of the American people." M.E. Sprengelmeyer, Court Nomi-
nee Grilled; McConnell's Writings Still Trouble Some Senators on Panel, ROCKY MTN. NEWS, Sept. 19, 
2002, at 28A (quoting McConnell). Roe was also considered in the Estrada confirmation hearing. Like 
McConnell, Estrada argued that "[Roe] is there, it is settled law, and I would follow it." Jonathan 
Groner, Estrada: Just One Vote Away?, LEGAL TIMES, Sept. 30, 2002, at 1. 
83. Senator Edward Kennedy, for example, said Sutton's record "fails to show that he will be able 
to set aside his own extreme agenda of rolling back federal power." Jack Torry & Jonathan Riskind, 
Judicial Nominee's Senate Vote Today, THE COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Apr. 29, 2003, at 1A. Outside of 
confirmation hearings, the Senate Judiciary Committee has paid some attention to Rehnquist Court 
decisionmaking. When the Democrats controlled the committee, for example, Senator Charles 
Schumer conducted hearings on whether the Senate could consider the Court's "ideological balance" 
when confirming nominees. Schumer Proposes New Confirmation Process for Judicial Nominations, 
U.S. Senate Press Release, at http://www.senate.gov/-schumer/SchumerWebsite/pressroom/press_ 
releases/PR01656.htm. 
84. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey 505 U.S. 833, 865 (1992) (recognizing the connection between 
the Court's "legitimacy" and the "people's acceptance"); Tom R. Tyler & Gregory Mitchell, Legitimacy 
and Empowerment of Discretionary Legal Authority: The United States Supreme Court and Abortion 
Rights, 43 DUKE L.J. 703, 715 (1994) (discussing the proposition that public belief in the Court's legiti-
macy "enhances public acceptance of controversial Court decisions"). 
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the Court. "For the mass public," as Gregory A. Caldeira and James L. Gibson 
have shown, "broad political values--commitment to social order and support 
for democratic norms" insulate the Court from political attack.85 Moreover, al-
though there is reason to think that public support for the Court would be in-
versely related to the number of statutes that the Court strikes down,86 the 
Court can sidestep political attacks by picking its targets wisely; for example, 
striking down laws that are of little concern to Congress and the people. More 
to the point, the increasing pace of Rehnquist Court decisions striking down 
federal statutes has not had a negative impact on the Court's popularity with 
the people. In a June 1994 Gallup Poll, eighty percent of U.S. citizens said they 
have "some," "quite a lot," or a "great deal" of confidence in the Supreme 
Court.87 In a June 2001 poll, six months after Bush v. Gore, public support for 
the Court stood at eighty one percent.88 Furthermore, there is some reason to 
think that the Court is paying attention to this polling data. Consider Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist's 1999 year-end report. The Chief Justice approvingly cited a 
February 1999 Gallup Poll showing that "80 percent of Americans surveyed 
stated that they had a 'great deal' or 'fair' amount of trust for the judicial 
branch of government, far exceeding figures for the other branches. "89 And 
while this statement proves very little, there is ample reason to think that the 
Court is well-aware of the social and political forces surrounding its decision 
making. 
B. The Rehnquist Court's Turn to Federalism Reflects the Court's Desire to 
Steer Away From Politically Costly, Divisive Social Issues. 
Before 1995, the "first" Rehnquist Court (1986-94) decided seventeen cases 
involving social issues (abortion and other privacy issues, affirmative action, gay 
rights, and government speech on religious topics-school prayer, creches) and 
thirteen federalism-related cases; from 1995-2002, the "second" Rehnquist 
Court decided thirteen social issue cases and twenty-five federalism-related 
cases.90 More striking, the first Rehnquist Court did little in the way of changing 
the law. For example, the Court reaffirmed abortion rights and the prohibition 
against school prayer. The second Rehnquist Court, in contrast, has pursued 
85. The Etiology of Public Support for the Supreme Court, 36 AM. J. POLl. SCI. 635. 636 (1992). 
86. Gregory A. Caldeira, Neither The Purse Nor the Sword: Dynamics of Public Confidence in the 
United States Supreme Court, 80 AM. POLl. SCI. REV. 1209, 1222 (1986). 
87. Gallup Poll (question ID, USGALLUP.94MAR R09C), conducted on Mar. 3, 1994, Gallup 
News Service, released on Mar. 31, 1994, available at www.gallup.com. 
88. Gallup Poll (question ID, USGALLUP.01JUN8 R12C), conducted on June. 8, 2001, Gallup 
News Service, released on June, 18,2001, available at www.gallup.com. 
Gallup Poll, Roper Center for Public Opinion. 
89. William H. Rehnquist , 1999 Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary , at http://www.uscourts. 
gov/ttb/jan00ttb/jan2000.html. 
90. For an exhaustive and illuminating overview of differences between the first and second 
Rehnquist Courts, see Thomas W. Merrill, The Making of the Second Rehnquist Court: A Preliminary 
Analysis, 47 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 569 (2003). 
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several federalism-related doctrinal innovations.91 Social and political forces 
figure prominently in this story. Consider, for example, Justices O'Connor's 
and Kennedy's refusal to both sign onto the social-conservative agenda and, in 
recent years, to oppose the granting of certiorari on most "social issues" cases.92 
My suspicion is that these Justices were influenced by the following: the Sen-
ate's rejection of Robert Bork and its hazing of Clarence Thomas; Congress's 
approval of the 1991 Civil Rights Act (overturning twelve Supreme Court deci-
sions limiting the scope of civil rights laws); and interest group pressures on 
Congress and the Court.93 In sharp contrast, social and political forces did not 
stand in the way of the Court's turn to federalism. The public and Congress, as 
noted above, both signaled the Court that it could pursue an anti-Congress 
agenda. Correspondingly, there is no federalism constituency; up until now, in-
terest groups and lawmakers have shown little interest in federalism.94 In criti-
cal respects, the Rehnquist Court has protected itself by limiting the reach of its 
federalism revolution. For example, by upholding family leave legislation and 
fencing out voting rights legislation from its federalism revival, the Court has 
handed significant victories to traditional civil rights interests.95 
C. Notwithstanding Bush v. Gore, Rehnquist Court Decisionmaking Cannot 
be Neatly Characterized Along Ideological (Conservative) or Partisan (Re-
publican) Lines. 
First, the Rehnquist Court has targeted both Democratic and Republican in-
terests. Consider, for example, the most controversial of the Rehnquist Court's 
federalism decisions-those invalidating the VA W A, the GFSZA, the Brady 
Bill, the RFRA, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and the Age Dis-
crimination in Employment Act (ADEA). With the exception of the VA WA 
91. See id. 
92. See id. at 619. In making this point, I do not mean to suggest that the second Rehnquist Court 
has no interest in tackling divisive social issues. My point instead is that social and political forces help 
explain Rehnquist Court decisions about the merits of and selection of cases. 
93. Neal Devins, Congress and the Making of the Second Rehnquist Court, 47 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 773. 
For a more detailed explanation, see Merrill, supra note 90, at 630-32; see also Neal Devins, Explaining 
Grutter v. Bollinger, 152 U. PENN. L. REV. 347 (2003) (explaining the pivotal role that social and politi-
cal forces played in the Supreme Court's 2003 approval of affirmative action in higher education). 
94. See Devins, supra note 35, at 1314-24 (detailing confirmation hearing politics); Whittington, 
supra note 7, at 515-16 (contrasting the Court's federalist agenda to its agenda on abortion rights and 
environmental regulation). 
95. See Nevada Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003) (upholding the Family Medical 
Leave Act and, in so doing, recognizing that Congress has broad authority to enact legislation protect-
ing the interests of women and minorities). In another federalism ruling that sided with civil rights 
plaintiffs, the Court approved portions of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) in Tennessee v. 
Lane, 124 S. Ct. 1978 (2004). Holding that Congress had demonstrated "a pattern of unequal treatment 
in a wide range of public services," the Court refused to exempt states from portions of the ADA re-
quiring elevators or ramps in the court houses, voting booths, or other critical public services. /d. at 
1990-94. In so ruling, the Court limited its Garrett ruling and avoided a possible political backlash. The 
Court also avoided a political backlash by backing civil rights interests in its 2003 approval of race con-
scious university admissions. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003). See also Devins, supra note 93 
at 362-81 (detailing overwhelming interest group and elected government support for affirmative action 
in higher education). 
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and the ADEA, Senate Democrats and Republicans both co-sponsored each of 
these bills.96 With the exception of the VA W A (against which most Senate Re-
publicans voted), each of these bills was enacted without dissent. 97 Further-
more, even if some of these bills are deemed "Democratic" (VAW A, ADA, 
ADEA, Brady), other bills invalidated by the Rehnquist Court cannot be char-
acterized this way. Decisions invalidating the RFRA, the Line Item Veto Act, 
the CDA, and measures restricting the free speech rights of public employees 
and the legal services corporation, for example, were dubbed "extreme liberal 
activism" by Bill Marshall.98 Second, as mentioned above, the Court has been 
somewhat middle-of-the-road on divisive social policy issues. Instead of being 
hard-line, the Court is "not easy to classify."99 For example, rather than over-
rule any landmark ruling establishing "new and controversial constitutional 
rights,"100 the Court reaffirmed Miranda v. Arizond0\ Roe, and Engel v. Vitale102 
(school prayer). The Court also approved diversity-based affirmative action 
and rejected a challenge to pledge of allegiance legislation on jurisdictional 
grounds.103 More striking, the Court extended substantive due process to homo-
sexual sodomy104 and, in so doing, overturned the Burger Court's Bowers v. 
Hardwick10l decision. Also, by upholding so-called soft money limits in cam-
paign finance legislation, the Court appeared less concerned "with the fine 
points of constitutional doctrine than with real-world context and conse-
96. Devins, supra note 35, at 1309. 
97. See id; see also infra Part III (C). 
98. William P. Marshall, Conservatives and the Seven Sins of Judicial Activism, 73 U. COLO. L. 
REV. 1217, 1247 (2002). Another, more recent, example of the Rehnquist Court's willingness to frus-
trate the social conservative agenda is Ashcroft v. American Civil Liberties Union , 124 S. Ct. 2783 
(2004). By a five to four vote, the Court rejected congressional efforts to protect minors from exposure 
to sexually explicit materials on the internet. Concluding that there may be less restrictive means to 
police the internet, the Court approved the granting of a preliminary injunction against enforcement of 
the Child Online Protection Act. 
99. Kathleen M. Sullivan, A Court Not Easy to Classify , N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 2000, at A1; see also 
Alan M. Dershowitz, Curious Fallout from Bush v. Gore , N.Y. TIMES, July 4, 2001 , at A15. 
100. Robert F. Nagel, The High (and Mighty) Rehnquist Court, WALL ST. JNL., June 30, 2000, at 
A14. 
101. 384 u.s. 436 (1966). 
102. 370 u.s. 421 (1962). 
103. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (affirmative action); Elk Grove Unified School Dist. v. 
Newdow, 124 S. Ct. 2301 (2004) (pledge of allegiance) . The Newdow case also suggests that the Justices 
did not want the pledge and, with it, the Supreme Court to be an issue in the 2004 elections. See Linda 
Greenhouse, 8 Justices Block Effors to Excise Phrase in Pledge, N.Y. TIMES, June 15,2004 at Al. By 
concluding that a noncustodial father lacked standing to challenge the words "under God" in the 
pledge, the Court deftly overturned a federal court of appeals ruling that had invalidated the pledge 
statute. Noting that there had been "relatively little political or legal controversy" surrounding the 
pledge and that a substantive ruling on the constitutionality of the pledge may have been incoherent 
and devisive, the Washington Post commended the Court for its restraint. For the Post: "Punting may 
deflate the end of the term, but passivity here was a virtue, not a vice." Never Mind the Pledge, 
WASHINGTON POST, June 15, 2004 at A22. 
104. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
105. 478 u.s. 186 (1986). 
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quences,"-especially Congress's strong interest in the decision.106 Finally, when 
placing limits on Bush administration efforts to curtail wartime civil liberties, 
the Court concluded that "[a] state of war is not a blank check for the Presi-
dent."107 
D. The Rehnquist Court's Turn to Federalism Has Not Foreclosed Democratic 
Outlets. 
Specifically, when it comes to federalism, lawmakers and interest groups can 
find ways to respond to the Court's decision without amending the Constitution 
or curbing the Court's jurisdiction. For example, if a person does not like a de-
cision, she can make use of alternative theories of power. Also, several of the 
decisions left much of the statutory program in effect. Finally, other govern-
mental actors-states and municipalities-can fill the void when Congress can-
not. In contrast, a ruling that limits governmental power on abortion, for ex-
ample, settles the issue for all units of government. After Roe, no unit of 
government could regulate first trimester abortions. No federalism-related de-
cision backs the government into a similar corner.108 
Furthermore, in crafting its federalism counterrevolution, the Court has 
paid attention to signals from Congress and the people. Lawmaker and interest 
group opposition to the Court's pursuit of the social-conservative agenda, popu-
lar dissatisfaction with Congress, and the 1994 elections all pointed to a federal-
ism revival and, more generally, to decisions striking down federallaws.109 Be-
fore pursuing far-reaching doctrinal innovations, however, the Court waited to 
see if Congress would resist the Court's return to federalism. For this very rea-
son, the initial rulings of the second Rehnquist Court were somewhat ambigu-
ous-allowing the Court to look (and see Congress's reaction) before it 
leaped.110 Moreover, by upholding Congress's power to limit states' rights on 
gender-related issues and refusing, up until now, to meaningfully limit Con-
106. Linda Greenhouse, A Court Infused with Pragmatism, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2003, at A30 (dis-
cussing McConnell v. Federal Election Commission, 540 U.S. 93 (2003)). 
107. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633,2650 (2004). 
108. For this very reason, it is interesting to contrast Congress's response to City of Boerne v. Flores 
(invalidating the RFRA) to the calm following all other Rehnquist-era federalism decisions. Boerne 
prompted numerous expressions of disappointment with the Court as well as several legislative hear-
ings. Federalism, however, played no role in all of this. Congress's concern, instead, were the stan-
dards employed by the Supreme Court in religious liberty cases. In particular, Congress focused its op-
probrium on the very 1990 Supreme Court decision that prompted the RFRA, Employment Division v. 
Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (holding that generally applicable laws that burden religion are subject to 
rational basis, not heightened review). 
109. Before the 1994 elections, the Rehnquist Court (most notably in its 1992 reinvigoration of the 
Tenth Amendment, New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992)) had signalled its interest in federal-
ism. At the same time, the Court ratcheted up the scope and pace of its federalism revival after the 
1994 elections. For this reason, I think that both the anti-Congress rhetoric of the Contract with Amer-
ica and the fact that Republicans, for the first time since 1954, controlled both houses of Congress con-
tributed to the Rehnquist Court's return to federalism. 
110. See Devins, supra note 40, at 462 (describing this practice). 
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gress's spending power,111 the Court has deflected potential interest group and 
lawmaker resistance to its decisions. 112 
v 
CONCLUSION 
The increasing willingness of the Rehnquist Court to invalidate federal stat-
utes is very much tied to social and political forces. First, these decisions match 
popular distrust of Congress and the corresponding demise of the New 
Deal/Great Society nation-state. Second, through expedited review provisions 
and other paeans to judicial supremacy, Congress has signaled the Court that it 
is accepting of judicial invalidations of federal statutes. Correspondingly, to-
day's lawmakers do not think that courts should defer to Congress's constitu-
tional judgments. Third, Congress has spurred on the Court in other ways. It 
sometimes embraces anti-Congress rhetoric and, more generally, seems accept-
ing of devolving power away from the federal government. Moreover, with less 
of an investment in finding national solutions for national problems, Congress 
often enacts "position taking" legislation or legislation that can be invalidated 
without prompting an uproar from Congress, interest groups, or the general 
population. Fourth, when it comes to checking the Court, lawmakers, interest 
groups, and the people focus their energies on divisive social issues such as 
abortion, race, school prayer, and Miranda warnings. In contrast, there is no in-
terest group or constituency ready to mobilize around "federalism." Fifth, the 
Rehnquist Court has paid attention to these various signals. It has focused its 
energy on matters as to which the people and Congress have signaled the Court 
that the invalidation of legislation is acceptable, and it has generally avoided po-
larizing rulings on social issues. Moreover, it has neither prevented Congress 
from meeting urgent constituent demands nor has it targeted Democratic or 
Republican interests. Finally, it has moved incrementally-its initial rulings 
were somewhat ambiguous so that it could wait to see how Congress reacted to 
its decision. 
None of this is to say that the Justices on the Rehnquist Court (or at least 
the Justices in the majority) are not also advancing outcomes that match their 
personal public policy preferences. In other words, I am not arguing that there 
has been some kind of populist or legislative mandate for the Court to have in-
validated the thirty-one statutes it struck down from 1995-2002. My claim, in-
stead, is that the Rehnquist Court decisions striking down federal statutes are 
not particularly countermajoritarian. Instead, it often appears as if Congress 
111. Nevada Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003). 
112. See Linda Greenhouse, The Supreme Court: State Rights: Justices, 6-3, Rule Workers Can Sue 
States Over Leave, N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 2003, at Al. Also, on May 17, 2004, a unanimous Supreme 
Court validated Congress's Spending Clause power in Sabri v. United States, 124 S. Ct. 1941 (2004). 
Upholding a law that makes it illegal to bribe officials at state or local agencies that receive federal 
funds, the Court rejected the claim that the Spending Clause demands there be some connection be-
tween the bribe and the federal grant. Concluding that Congress employed "rational means" to safe-
guard federal funds, the Court upheld Congress's power to fight corruption at state and local agencies. 
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and the people are delegating to the Court the power to strike down federal 
laws-so much so that a Court decision invalidating a federal statute is no 
longer an event of great moment. In particular, through expedited review pro-
visions and "position taking" legislation, lawmakers often focus their energies 
on signing onto politically popular legislation and leave the decision of whether 
their handiwork is constitutional to the Court. Unless and until Rehnquist 
Court decisionmaking has "more foreseeable negative consequences for a wider 
range of interests,"113 Congress and U.S. citizens are likely to see the Court as 
simply doing its job. 
113. Whittington, supra note 7, at 515. 
